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Introduction

Three social revolutions took place in the middle years
of this past century. The New Deal established the principle
that the federal government has a direct responsibility to
care for the welfare of those in need, and that the government
also has a responsibility to regulate and manage the economy.
Then, in the aftermath of World War II, a social and cultural
revolution took place, highlighting the human rights movement and the change in women's roles.
Many Republicans and others have never accepted these revolutions. Not only did they attack the New Deal while it was
being put into effect, they have continued to assail the measures that have embodied it over the years. Many have
responded similarly to the social and cultural changes of the
past half-century. The first signs of an organized counterrevolutio:q. began with the Goldwater and Reagan speeches at the
Republican National Convention in 1964. When the Right
gained political power with Ronald Reagan's presidency in
1980, it began to undo those advances. With the ascendancy of
House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1994, the victory of George
W Bush in 2000, and the rise of House Majority Leader Tom
1
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Delay, the Right has now gained full control of the Republican
Party. Today, with all three branches of the federal government
under tight Republican control, that counterrevolution is fully
under way, and full control of the courts is a central goal.
The specific legislative goals of the Bush administration and
its allies are to privatize Social Security and Medicare, to largely
eliminate or shrink public welfare programs, and to weaken
environmental, health and safety, antimonopoly, and other regulatory measures designed to tame a market relentlessly driven
by a search for profits. As New York Times columnist Paul
Krugman put it, this crusade is powered by "an ideology that
denigrates almost everything other than the national defense,
that the government does." It is intended to tum the clock back
as much as possible to the 1920s, and even earlier to a time
when the federal government did relatively little and "dual federalism" doctrines governed. In its most extreme version its
goal is, in the words of Grover Norquist, the powerful archconservative president of Americans for Tax Reform, "to shrink
government to a size where I can drown it in a bathtub." 1
Civil and political rights are also under attack, particularly
those touching on personal autonomy like abortion and the
rights of gay people to live normal lives without being ostracized. Also targeted are the protections created for the many
racial and ethnic minorities, women, those who are disabled or
elderly, illegal aliens, and others shortchanged by life.
What the Right hopes to achieve was set out by Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg in a speech in September 2002 to the Cato
Institute, a conservative libertarian group. Ginsburg is a
Reagan appointee to the federal court of appeals in Washington, D.C. whom Reagan had also nominated for the
Supreme Court after the Senate rejected Robert Bork but was
forced to withdraw because Ginsburg had smoked marijuana
with students at Harvard. 2
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In the speech Ginsburg bemoans what he calls an absence of
fidelity to the text of the Constitution. As he sees it, this "infidelity" started with the New Deal Court in 1937 when it wrongly
sustained congressional power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate activities like union-management relations and other
activities that substantially affect the national economy. Ginsburg praises the nineteenth and early twentieth century decisions that narrowly restricted the federal governments power to
transportation and related facilities, and blocked federal regulation of manufacturing, no matter how great the impact on the
national economy or how difficult, if not impossible, it would be
for the states to deal with the problems. Under Great Depression
and New Deal pressures, the "wheels came off," according to
Ginsburg. For him, the current conservative Court is not conservative enough. He condemns its recent unanimous decision
allowing Congress to delegate broad powers to administrative
agencies, urging instead a doctrine that the Court has consistently rejected except for two 1935 decisions by the pre-New
Deal Court; in this regard, he is apparently echoing the views of
Northwestern University law professor Gary Lawson who has
argued that the post-New Deal adminis~ative state is unconstitutional and its validation by the legal system is nothing less than
a bloodless "constitutional revolution." He also criticizes the
current Court's refusal to force federal, state, and local governments to use an ambiguous constitutional provision, the "Takings" Clause, to compensate property owners when
environmental al}d other regulations reduce the value of the
property. If that clause were applied as Ginsburg would like, the
costs would be staggering and few state or local governments
would dare to adopt such regulations. 3
In his lament for this golden age, Ginsburg omits to mention
that these constitutional interpretations were developed at a
time when American capitalism was at its most rapacious and
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irresponsible, coinciding with the crude excesses that Mark
Twain named the Gilded Age and Vernon Parrington called
"The Great Barbecue." Parallels between these times and today
are not hard to find.
Although Ginsburg is primarily an economic and regulatory
specialist, he also castigates the Court for recognizing new
rights like the 1965 decision allowing married couples to use
contraceptives, as well as its recent ban on executing ilie mentally retarded. And he called on judges and scholars to renew
"fidelity to the text"-a return to the constitutional doctrines
that prevailed from the 1880s to 193 7 that disabled the federal
government from dealing with the most fundamental problems
facing this country, problems that state and local governments
could not possibly cope with.4
How successful the Right's counterrevolution will be is not
clear at this time. Much depends on the 2004 presidential election. No matter who is president, however, it is certain that the
right will not discontinue its campaign and that the effects of
what it achieves will continue for a long time to come.
Even to approach the realization of these goals and to ensure
that those effects do continue, it is necessary not only to pass
legislation and issue executive orders but to control the courts,
for many of these issues wind up in the courts, especially
human rights. Many of the rights in question were first establis~ed by the courts and all need to be implemented and
enforced by the courts. What judges have done can be undone
or cut back by other judges.
Who sits on the bench is also important to Republican electoral success. Since enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
which made it possible for African-Americans to vote in large
numbers, the South has become the Republican base. That
region has become almost as solidly Republican as it used to be
Democratic and, in both cases, very conser'Vative. Many of
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these Southern constituents are still hostile to black progress as
well as to the cultural changes of the past fifty years. These
voters are now indispensable to Republican success in gaining
the White House and in controlling Congress. Ronald Reagan
also managed to get the votes of socially conservative bluecollar Democrats, but Vice President Al Gore regained a
majority of these in 2000, and the Republicans want to win
them back.
Control of the courts is equally necessary in order to undo
the regulatory and welfare revolution. This is necessary to take
care of the pocketbook interests that.make up the more traditional wing of the Republican Party and provide the necessary
campaign funds. These groups are concerned about the interpretation and enforcement of regulatory and tax statutes, as
well as the challenges to these programs, and many of these
issues are decided by judges. The so-called states' rights movement to undermine the constitutional basis for many social and
environmental programs is a judge-made product, crafted by
the five conservative justices on the Supreme Court, conservative lawyers, and others, most of whom are prominent and
active members of the Heritage Foundation and the Federalist
Society.
The campaign to control the courts did not begin with the
George W. Bush presidency. It began twenty-four years ago
with tP.e Republican platform of 1980, which called for the
overturning of Roe v. Wade (the 1973 abortion decision) and
much of the work of the Supreme Court during the preceding
decades. This involved reducing access to the federal courts for
the redress of grievances, allowing greater state involvement in
religious matters, weakening the rules requiring fairness in
election district reapportionment, striking down voluntary and
other kinds of affirmative action, diluting the laws against
race and sex discrimination, virtually eliminating most legal
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protections for the accused, and dismissing challenges to
public or private authority for violation of statutory or constitutional rights by Medicare patients whose funding is terminated without a hearing, public assistance claimants,
handicapped people, antitrust plaintiffs, and anyone suing
under a Civil Rights Act provision.~
To fulfill this agenda, soon after his election in 1980 Reagan,
guided by his chief counselor, Edwin Meese, nominated young
right-wing ideologues like Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and
Richard Posner to the federal appellate bench where much of
our law is made. George H.W Bush continued what Reagan
and Meese had started, appointing such hard-right ideologues
as Clarence Thomas and Michael Luttig. There was a brief
eight-year hiatus during the Clinton administration, but
George W Bush has nominated conservatives even farther to
the right than Reagan and Bush Sr., like Janice Rogers Brown
and William Pryor.
If this right-wing campaign succeeds, it will have momentous consequences for the way Americans live now and for
what they take for granted. Consider the following situations:
In 1962, Sherri Finkbine, a Phoenix, Arizona, television personality and mother of four, became pregnant for the fifth time.
While she was pregnant, frightening reports began to circulate
that taking the drug thalidomide produced deformed babies,
without arms or legs. Finkbine had taken tranquilizers containing thalidomide. She immediately tried to get an abortion,
but Phoenix hospitals refused, because Arizona, like almost all
other states, had made it a crime to perform an abortion unless
it were to save the life of the mother. Finkbine then flew to
Sweden to get the abortion. Other women seeking an abortion
could not afford to do so, and it is estimated that the death toll
from badly performed self-abortions and from illegal abortionists was about a million women annually then.
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Fast forward twenty years later to 1982: Sherri Finkbine
would not have to fly to Sweden anymore. American women
could now obtain a safe and legal abortion at hospitals, clinics,
and other authorized providers.
Fast forward twenty years again to 2002: Women like Sherri
Finkbine who live in Phoenix, Arizona, can still get a legal
abortion, but women who don'tlive in big cities probably cannot.
Eighty percent of Arizona counties have no abortion provider.
Nationwide, it is becoming more and more difficult and burdensome to obtain an abortion. Although abortion is still legal,
many clinics, doctors, and other abortion providers have stopped
operating because state and local governments have imposed
waiting, informal consent, reporting, and other burdensome
requirements that make it prohibitive, expensive, and difficult to
operate. As a result, women who are poor or young can no longer
obtain a safe and legal abortion.
Each of these immense changes in the lives of women
resulted from a decision by a few politically connected lawyers
appointed to be judges who are empowered to make such decisions for the rest of their lives, and who are accountable for
these decisions to no one but their own consciences. The first
major shift, of course, was the 1973 decision in the Roe case, in
which seven Supreme Court Justices established a woman's
right to an abortion and virtually prohibited states from raising
obstacles to abortion in the early months of pregnancy, which
is when the overwhelming number of abortions are done. The
change between 1982 and 2002 also resulted from court decisions: the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood
of Pennsylvania v. Casey, preserved the right to have an abortion
but allowed states and localities virtually unlimited discretion
in erecting barriers like waiting periods and notification and
consent procedures. Most of these barriers were then upheld by
the lower courts with no further review by the Supreme Court.6
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Abortion is but one example among countless others of the
immense power we have always given our courts. Recent
examples include:
• The school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas, which launched the civil
rights movement. This showed that major social
change could be achieved through the courts, and it
stimulated legal action by women, the gay rights
movement, prisoners, and many others who had long
suffered from prejudice and discrimination.
• The electoral district reapportionment decisions that
reshaped American politics when the Supreme Coun
ruled that the courts could insist on the "one person
one vote" principle, so that the votes of some would '
not count for more than the votes of others.
• The school prayer decisions that barred officially mandated religious observances in schools.
• The gay rights decisions that first barred states from
denying gay people the right to fight for statutes protecting them against discrimination and then prohibited making criminals of them. 7
But judicial power has not always been benign. For example:

Child labor. In 1919 the Supreme Court prevented the federal
government from moving against the scourge of child labor in

Hammer v. Dagenhart.
The Depression. In the 1930s, the Court struck down
numerous efforts by the president and Congress to cope with the
ravages of the Great Depression in the Butler and Carter cases.
School desegregation. In 1974, in Bradley v. Milliken , the
Court refused to require Detroit suburbs to participate in
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desegregating the Detroit schools, with the result that our cities
have become increasingly populated by impoverished minorities with pressing needs for social services but with a
decreasing tax base.
Worker health and safety. In 1905, Lochnerv. New York struck
down an effort to improve the health and safety of bakers in
New York by limiting their working hours. In 1923, the Court
nullified minimum wage statutes in Adkins v. Children's Hospital. Until the 1930s, courts consistently ruled against labor
union efforts to organize and to strike.
Overtime pay. In 1999, in Alden v. Maine, the Court prevented probation officers employed by the state of Maine from
suing the state for violating their rights to overtime pay under
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Violence against women. In fall 1994, Christy Brzonkala, a
freshman at Vrrginia Polytechnic Institute, was brutally raped
by two members of the school's football team. The school did
little about it, so Christy sued one student under the federal
Violence Against Women Act. The act had been passed with·
the support of some thirty-eight states who told Congress they
could ~ot deal with the problem because of local sexism. In
2000, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court threw out Christy's
suit, finding the statute unconstitutional. The majority did not
think violence against women substantially affected interstate
commerce despite what dissenting Justice David Souter,
appointed by President George H.W. Bush, called a "mountain
of data assembled by Congress" detailing the billions of dollars
violence against women cost the national economy each year.
The heritage of slavery. And then there were two of the most
infamous decisions in American history, Dred Scott 'v. Sandford
in 1857, which ruled that Blacks could never be citizens, and
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which stamped America with racial
segregation for the next sixty years.8
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Most of these decisions are constitutional rulings, but the
courts' power to interpret statutes is equally important, for in
many cases a court'.s interpretation of a statute or regulation is
decisive. The legislature can reverse the Court'.s decision, and
sometimes does. That is what happened in 1991 when Congress overturned eight Supreme Court de~isions that had seriously weakened enforcement of the laws against racial and
gender discrimination in employment. In most cases, however,
politics, inertia, and a lack of time or attention make the judicial interpretation final.9
This judicial conservatism is not unusual. Although the federal courts' performance since 1954, the date of the school
desegregation decision, may have led many people to believe
that the courts usually lead the struggle against inju?tice and
inequality, for most of our history they have not. Indeed for
most of American history, the federal courts have been a bastion of conservatism rather than a leader in protecting humaD:
rights and promoting social justice. They were probably
intended that way, at least by some of the Framers. Except .for
relatively brief periods, the courts have been primarily concerned with protecting the haves against the have-nots-the
poor, workers, farmers, blacks, and women-and upholding
· official action.
There have always been significant eJ!:ceptions to that conservatism throughout our history. But a. sustained commitment
to liberty, justice, and equality did not take place until the last
three quarters of the twentieth century. It started in the 1930s,
hit a peak with Brown and the decisions of the 1960s, and concluded with the important rulings in the 1970s and 1980s
establishing a woman's right to an abof!i9n and protection
against discrimination in general, approving affirmative action
for minorities and women, and promoting school desegregation and church-state separation. By 1988, that period was

)
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largely over. The next chapter will explore the history of the federal courts more closely.
All the decisions described above were decided by the
Supreme Court. In our hierarchical judicial structure, the
Supreme Court sets the basic rules within which the lower
courts and the state courts must operate. But the Supreme
Court decides very few cases, and a good proportion of those
are from state courts. From 2001to2003, the Court decided an
average of only sixty-five federal cases per year. By contrast, the
thirteen federal appellate courts have been deciding approximately 28,000-30,000 per year. Although the overwhelming
proportion of these cases-perhaps as many as 90-95 percentare nonideological and noncontroversial, all require time,
money, effort, and the expenditure of scarce judicial resources,
and all are important to the people involved. In the criminal
cases, liberty and public safety are at stake; in the civil cases,
substantial amounts of money, because federal appeals are
expensive, and in many cases today, must involve at least
$75,000. For litigants in these cases, the thirteen Courts of
Appeals are the courts of last resort for all but a tiny handful.
In deciding these appeals, the lower courts have a good deal
of discretion at both the trial and appellate levels. All court
decisions, including and perhaps especially Supreme Court
decisions, leave a great deal of room for interpretation and
application, and many statutory and other issues never even
get to the High Court. For example:
•In 1998, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Boston struck down the affirmative
action plan adopted by the school system's renowned
flagship school, the Bosto11 Latin School, to increase
the number of minority students who would otherwise
not be able to gain admission to the elite high school.
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An affirmative action plan to integrate a magnet elementary school in Montgomery County, Maryland, was
struck down by the Fourth Circuit in Richmond in
Eisenberg v_ Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schl_,._io On the other
hand, in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District

(2000), a split panel of the Second Circuit in New York
upheld a similar plan involving transfers from Rochester
to suburban schools. None of these cases was reviewed
by the Supreme Court, which has not dealt with affirmative action in education below the college level.
• In 2000, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado
constitutional amendment that barred al)y state or
local action to protect gay people against discrimination. Cincinnati had earlier adopted a local charter
amendment barring any municipal antidiscrimination
action against gays. Despite the Suprem~ Court decision in the Colorado case, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati upheld the charter amendment and the Supreme Court declined to r:eview the
·
decision.
• In 1933, the federal court in New York declared that
James Joyce's great novel Ulysses was not "obscene."
Americans could now read one of the greatest novels of
the Lwentieth century without having to smuggle it in
past customs inspectors, and publishers could print it
wi~out facing criminal penalties. 10
Even when the Supreme Court does get around to deciding an
issue, it may be years after the lower courts have grappled with
the problem, for it often waits to see how the appellate courts
have viewed the issues. Until the Supreme Court decides the
case, many litigants and others who lose in an appellate court
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decision may have lost opportunities and benefits to which
they would otherwise be entitled. For example, in 2003 the
Supreme Court ruled that a university could use racial preferences in their admissions process in order to achieve racial
diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger. In 1996, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had ruled otherwise in Hopwood v.
State of Texas, and for seven years, many minority students
have had difficulty attending universities in Texas, Mississippi,
and Louisiana during their normal educational years, particularly the graduate schools. For example, the percentage of
Mexican-American and black law students at the University of
Texas Law School dropped from 19.9% in 1995 before the Hopwood decision, to 6.5% in 1997, and reached only 9.25% in
2002, after years of intense recruiting. 11
One reason for the power of the American judiciary was suggested by Tocqueville's much-quoted observation that "scarcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not
resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." This is now
truer than ever, for America is probably the most litigious society
in history. It has always been that way, even in colonial times. 12
Another reason for the power of the judiciary is that legislatures, and particularly Congress, have usually been dominated
by powerful racist, sexist, and business interests, and have failed
to meet such pressing needs as ending racial and gender discrimination, gun control, monitoring corporate dishonesty,
reducing cigarette smoking, and enacting meaningful campaignfinance reform and affordable health care, to mention but a few
examples. Our system of separated powers has contributed to
these failures, since for most of the past half-century the White
House and Congress have been in different hands, and interbranch and even House-Senate competition have often resulted
in deadlock. Some state legislatures have managed to move forward on some of these issues like campaign-finance reform,
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smoking, corporate malfeasance, and prescri_ption drugs, but
these are still scattered. Courts have therefore been called upon
13
to fill the vacuum.
These federal judges whose authority is invoked so often are
appointed by the president, usually from members of his own .
political party and often upon 'the recommendation of senators
or other powerful politicians; in most state court systems, the
judges are elected. Because judges influence so much about
how people live, judicial appointments are political matters,
and American judges almost always obtain their offices because

of political connections. Judges are often former prosecutors,
who in the United States are steeped in politics, since the prosecutor's office can provide high public visibility and is often a
stepping stone to either high~r office or a judgeship. This is
p!lrticularly true at the state and local levels where the chief
prosecutor is usually elected. Chief]ustice Earl Warren is probably the best-known example of such a rise. When serving as
District Attorney of Alameda County, California, he was considered one of the ablest prosecutors in the nation. That reputation won him the governorship of California and ultimately
the highest judicial office in the United States.
Appointments to the Supreme Court have always drawn a
great deal of public and expert attention. Until recently, however, only a few political scientists have studied the way in
which lower federal court judges are chosen. This book focuses
on that latter process.
At this point, certain disclosures and disclaimers are appropriate. This book is not a value-free exercise. I have been
involved as a scholar, lawyer, and writer in many of the constitutional and legal issues discussed in these pages, and have
been an active participant in many of the nomination disputes;
in 1988, I published a study of the Reagan nominations, much
of which is incorporated in this book in Chapter 2. Although I
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have ttied to document and verify the factual assertions that
are made, errors have certainly crept in and for these I apologize in advance.
As for my p_oint of view, I am what might be considered an
old-fashione~ liberal, with no apologies, even though the word
"liberal" has fallen into disrepute in some circles on both the
Left and the Right. As a rough approxim<!.tion of my views, I
can say that I believe in the necessity of federal, state, and local
action to deal with those shonchanged by binh or fonune and
those in need; that our Constitution is a "living Constitution"
that must respond to the changing needs and obligations of
society; and that judges have an obligation to promote "libeny
and justice for all." The Constitution gives federal judges the
unique privilege of tenure for life without even an obligation to
retire. This is a privilege found nowhere else in the developed
world, and the only justification for so great a power, if there is
any, is to enable our federal judges to defend and promote the
great rights enshrined in our constitutional and moral heritage
when they are under threat.
These views will not be defended here, for this book is not
about whether those views are correct or misguided, but only
to state the premises on which this book is written and the
judgments expressed. I will simply note that national and
international ttibunals are being assigned a similar role all over
the world. 1•
A final note on my use of the word "ideology." By that I
mean what the dictionary says it is: "the body of beliefs that
guides a particular individual, class, or culture."
My focus is on the past twenty-five years for reasons that will
become clear. Before turning to that, it is important to explore
the development of the federal courts in our history. For lack of
;pace, knowledge, and because of the dominance of the
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Supreme Court in our judicial system, there will be relatively
little discussion of the lower courts in this chapter, but rather it
will focus on how the Supreme Court has shaped our law, and
particularly on its ideological premises.

•••
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(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); Romer v. Evans, 517
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(minimum wage); Aldm v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (overtime pay); U.S. v. Morrtsson, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (violence against women); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1857) (slavery); P~ssy v. foguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (segregation).
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E2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
11. Grutta v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003); Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 E3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996). For the numbers, see www.law.utexas.edu/hopwood.
12. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Everyman ed.), p. 280.
13. For the authors views on the current "states rights" decisions, see Herman
Schwartz, ed. "The States Rights Assault on Federal Authority" in The Rehnquist
Court, pp. 155-168 (2002) and "The Supreme Coun's Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conservatives; Annals, March 2001, p. 119; See generally. Herman Schwartz, The
Struggle For Constitutional justice in Post-Communist Europe (2000).
Packing the Courts (1988).
14. See Herman Schwartz, note 13.

Chapter 1

1787-1980

Even a cursory glance at American history shows that a
powerful politically shaped and oriented judiciary is nothing
new. It has roots deep in our history. Even in colonial times,

courts were called upon to resolve serious disputes, for "the
colonists were conditioned to a great number of courts and an
elaborate system of appeals." During these years, Americans
also became accustomed to a form of judicial review of their
laws, for the Privy Council in England had the power to veto
statutes and ordinances enacted by colonial legislatures.l..
One theme in the Revolution.was an attack on the executive in
favor 61 legislative power, and with it a downgrading of judges,
who by 1776 had come to be seen and distrusted as instruments
of royal power. During the 1770s, legislative controls over the
selection, salaries, and even removal of judges were established.
In Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, judges were elected
annually, and in Georgia, the legislature could remove every judge
but the chief justice whenever it wished to.2
In the postrevolutionary years, economic hardship was
widespread, and with it went a substantial growth in the debtor
population. State legislatures responded with legislation
19
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favoring debtors, including legislative approval of paper
money, moratoriums allowing delayed debt repayment, and by
occasionally interfering with judicial functions. Many influential people like James Madison, and particularly the more
affluent, became hostile to state legislatures. Throughout the
Federalist papers, Madison warns against legislative overweening. In Pennsylvania, he wrote:
The constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers
assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the
judges, which the Constitution expressly requires to be fixed,
had been occasional varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary department, frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination.

Madison also quotes Jefferson, who in his Notes on the State of
Virginia ·complained that the Virginia legislature "have decided
rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy. "3
This hostility to legislative excesses raised the status of the
judiciary among the propertied classes. Judges came to be seen
among the propertied as somehow representative of the popular will, and not as the antidemocratic institution that they
had been considered as earlier, and would be considered to be
again. Arguments for judicial review of legislation began to be
put forward, with some success. Within a relatively short
period judges were raised to a position of eminence they had
never before enjoyed.4
The provisions in the Constitution providing for life tenure and
other protections for judges reflect this elevatedstatus. Other provisions setting out the jurisdiction of the federal courts incorporated the conservative bias that was d.eliberately intended to be
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applied by those federal judges. According to John Frank, "It was
clearly contemplated that the judges were to be conservative and
sound men of property." As Hamilton put it in the Federalist 78,
the courts would be "essential" to deal with "unjust and partial
laws" that would injure "the private rights of particular classes of
citizens." Frank also suggests that the jurisdictional provisions,
including the diversity clause allowing access to the federal courts
for suits by citizens of one state or a foreign country against citizens of another state, was designed to help land speculators. In
1787, "there were fortunes to be made" in buying land cheaply
from a state or the federal government and reselling it at an
inflated price, and many of the Founding Fathers, including
Robert Morris, the "financier of the American Revolution," John
Marshall and his brother James, George Mason, Patrick Henry,
and many others were avid land speculators. Frank notes that "the
Supreme Couri aided virtually every land speculator who came
before it from 1790to1815," and concludes that "one heavy factor
in establishing diversity jurisdiction was the consideration of the
comparative class bias" of the federal and state systems, for most
of the federal judges were expected to be-and were-from
among the well-to-do classes. Although most state court systems
also became favorable to business interests, the Founders would
not be disappointed in their expectations for the federal courts.5
The best example of this judicial favoritism for land speculators was Fletcher v. Peck, which involved one of the greatest and
most colorful land swindles in American history. In 1794
Georgia was in deep financial trouble. It had heavy obligations
and its treasury was empty. Its one great asset was the Yazoo territory comprising almost all of Alabama and Georgia, some 35
million acres. In December 1794 the Georgia legislature sold the
entire Yazoo territory to four land companies for $500,000 or $7
million 2003 dollars: this amounted to 1.5 cents per acre or
about 12 cents in today's money. Every member of the Georgia
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legislature who voted for the sale, with one exception, as well as
other public officials and notables, had been bribed by the land
companies.
The land companies promptly resold the land at huge profits;
many of the purchasers knew nothing about the bribery. The
Georgia voters were outraged and threw out the "Yazooist" legislature. The new Georgia Assembly tried to undo the sale by
repealing the law authorizing the sale. Political controversies
continued for many years, and the matter finally reached the
Supreme Court. In 1810 the Supreme Court struck down the
Georgia repeal statute on the ground that it violated the constitutional ban on states "impairing the obligation of contracts."
The case was almost certainly made up by the parties who were
not really adversaries, for both sides were involved in the Yazoo
land companies and brought the case in order to get a ruling
from the Court to settle matters.*
The Fletcher case has been described as a vital "link between
capitalism and constitutionalism," and it made the contract clause
into "the major constitutional limitation on state legislatures in a
period when the states were the source of most laws regulating
business interests. Between 1810and1889 the contract clause was
invoked in almost 40 per cent of all cases challenging the validity
of state legislation." It was the basis for some seventy-five decisions striking down state efforts to regulate business. 7
During the first decades of the Republic, federal judges were
usually politically prominent figures, who viewed judicial office
as one more arena for their political activity. Intensely partisan
enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Laws by Supreme Court
Justice Samuel Chase, which led to his impeachment and nearconviction, is but one example; there were many others.
The great early battles, as bitter as any since then, were
* The decision was also legally questionable because the "contract" was a public grant.
It also involved further "obligations" since the grant had already been made.
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between the Federalists, the party of the financial and commercial
classes, and the agrarian and artisan elements led by Thoma.5]efferson, then called the Republicans, who became todays Democrats. Washington and Adams, the Federalist Party presidents,
appointed only Federalists to the federal bench. ~ a lame duck
president in 1801, Adams tried to use newly adopted legislation
reforming the federal courts to appoint Federalists to sixteen
newly created Circuit Court judgeships. These were the welllmown "midnight judges," so called because their commissions
were signed by Secretary of State and Chief]ustice-designatejohn
Marshall just before Adams left office. In one of the few fights over
lower court judges in the early years, thejeffersonians repealed
the legislation and removed the judges.
During these years, the Federal government was beginning
its acquisitive binge, getting and holding property free from
state government control, which was a major concern of the
emerging business interests. Courts became a central battleground. As Gordon Wood writes:
judges now became the arbiters between the emerging separate spheres of public power and private rights. Law became
more and more of a science removed from politics and comprehended by only an enlightened few who needed to be educated in special professional law schools. The desire for an
independent expert judiciary was bred by the continuing and
ever renewed fears of democratic politics.... Efforts to carve
out an exclusive sphere of activity for the judiciary, a sphere
where the adjudicating of private rights was removed from
policies and legislative power, contributed to the remarkable
process by which the judiciary in America suddenly emerged
out of its colonial insignificance to become by 1800 the principal means by which popular legislatures were controlled and
limited. The most dramatic Institutional transformation in the
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early Republic was the rise of what was called an "independent
judiciary."•

So powerful a role for an unelected and unaccountable institution is anomalous in a democracy, especially since the incumbents of that institution have life tenure. In the federal judiciary
this really means "life," for federal judges are not fo~ced to retire
at a set age as in every other modem judiciary. This imperviousness to de~ocratic control can be justified only if it is used
to protect democratic values that the community considers vital
and that majority rule may jeopardize. The courts need their
immunity to democratic control when they challenge the
majority and _o verturn the judgments of the electorate on behalf
of some unpopular individual, group, or cause.•
For rµost of our history, however, the rights most protected
by the courts have been the rights of the hayes, or in more legal
language, the rights of property. Here another factor comes into
play: the ubiquitous and powerful role of lawyers in American
life. Again, Tocqueville said it best:
If I ware asked where I p!ace the American aristocracy, I
should reply without hesitation that it is ncit among the rich,
who are unite.d by no. common tie, but that it o~cupies the
judicial bench and the bar.
As the lawyers form the only enlightened class whom the people
do not mistrust, they are oaturally called upon to occupy most of
the p~blic stations.They fill the legislative assembli~ and are at the
head of the administration; they consequently exercise a powerful
influence upon the formation of the law and upon its execution.'
* The other great functions of the federal judiciary are (1) umpiring clashes between the
other two branches and occasional clashes between the judiciary and ~ither or both of
the other two (2) federal statutory construction. In principle, the latter raises few Issues
of nonaccountabillty. since a legislature unhappy with a coun construction can revise
the statute by ordinary legislative process. In practice this is often difficult.
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Tocqueville considered this a great piece of good luck for the
United States because he believed that lawyers-including
those on the bench-would be a conservative force. As Gordon
Wood wrote, "The desire for an independent expert judiciary
was bred by the continuing and ever renewed fears of democratic politics. "10
And for much of American history, federal judges have been
such a conservative force, drawn largely from the social and
economic middle and upper classes throughout the century.
Even when the Jeffersonians were in power, the men appointed
to the bench were largely conservative in their outlook and
committed to protecting the interests of property-holders. For
example, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story was known as a
conservative even before his appointment to the Court by the
Jeffersonian Madison. It was Story who wrote Swift v. Tyson
(1842), the decision that made the federal courts readily accessible to large business interests looking for federal judges who
would apply business-friendly federal law in order to escape
the often more populist state courts.11
Swift dealt with the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction: suits
between citizens of different states. Like Fletcher v. Peck, Swift
involved a fraudulent land deal. Two men sold some Maine property that they did not own to Tyson for $1,450 (about $20,000
today). Tyson gave them a draft drawn on himself in payment,
and they transferred the draft to Swift to satisfy a debt they owed
him. Swift, who knew nothing of the fraud, tried to collect on
the draft from Tyson, who refused to pay. Under the 1789 judiciary Act, in diversity cases the federal courts were supposed to
apply the relevant state law, for in these cases the litigants are in
federal court only because they come from different states.
Under New York law, Tyson would have won, but Story ruled
that federal law applied except where state statutes were
involved, and Tyson had to pay Swift.12
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Swift v. Tyson shaped the course of American commercial law
for almost 100 years untP it was overturned in an opinion by
justice Louis D. Brandeis in 1938 in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
It enabled businesses that operated in many states to escape
state laws and judges who were often more sympathetic to
worker and agricultural interests. Swift was especially useful to
insurance companies because the federal courts developed

legal doctrines in the diversity cases that were far more favorable toward insurance companies than state laws. The federal
courts also developed their own tort law, the law that decides
who is liable for the damages when there is an accidental or
intentional injury. This was particularly important in connection with on-the-job injuries~ The fe~eral courts decided that if
a worker was hurt because the mistakes or some other action
of another worker contributed to his injury, even if only marginally, the employer was not liable. This doctrine, known as
the "fellow servant" doctrine, was dev~loped in the steel
industry where injuries were commonplace. It left most
workers hurt on the job without any recourse, for most of the~e
cases wound up in the federal courts. Even if the injured
worker wanted to sue the other worker, the latter rarely had
any money to pay for the medical bills, lost wages, or other
damages resulting from the injury. 13
Perhaps inadvertently, Congress also got into the act by
enacD:ng a general "removal" statute in 1875 to protect blacks
and Southern Unionists, though some senators almost certainly had other goals in mind. Under the 1875 law, any litigant
in a state court case in which the plaintiffs are in states dilierent
from the defendants or in which federal law or the Constitution are involved could "remove" the case from the state court
to a federal court. Although blacks and Soµthern Unionists
wound up getting little benefit from this statute for a long
time, railroads, insurance companies, and other interstate
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corporations quickly and enthusiastically resorted to removal
in order to get into the business-friendly federal courts and to
evade state judges and legislatures increasingly resentful of
eastern capitalists. Not until the 1960s civil rights movement
was removal used primarily to protect blacks and civil rights
workers.
The federal courts were not only biased toward business
with an often blind faith in the market, but they were also
expensive and inconvenient, giving the big multistate corporate litigant, who could remove the case from the local court to
a distant federal court, a great advantage.
Diversity jurisdiction was only one of many pro-business
tools. The tight ties between business and the Republican Party,
together with Republican control of the White House during
all but sixteen of the sixty-seven years between 1865 and 1932,
resulted in a militantly pro-business judiciary led by the
Supreme Court, which used not only diversity but other federal
court doctrines and powers to the fullest. For example, in 1875
Congress also authorized suits raising federal questions to be
brought in the federal courts. As a result, the federal courts
became the principal forum for litigating isS?eS that arose
under either Congressional statutes or the federal Constitution. As Judge Patricia Wald has observed, u After the tum of
the twentieth century, as the business offederal courts began to
deal less with patents and admiralty and more with politically
volatile issues such as antitrust, labor disputes, child labor, corruption, and due process challenges to governmental regulation, issue-oriented politics increasingly intruded on judicial
selection." And since the federal judges were largely chosen by
presidents who were sympathetic to business, so were the
courts.14
The Swift v. Tyson doctrine in diver5ity cases gave the federal
courts the power to shape private commercial law. During the
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period between the end of Reconstruction and before the
arrival of the New Deal Court, the Swift case was supplemented
by the due process and cominerce clause cases which gave the
federal judges a weapon against public action. Using the .~iue
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868
primarily to protect the freed slaves, the Court struck down
much state social legislation. The 1905 Lochner v. New York
decision, which nullified a New York law limiting the working
hours of bakery workers is the best-known example; the Court
did not believe the statute was a "reasonable" health measure.
The Court's decisions narrowly construing the federal commerce clause and the federal taxing powers also undermined
the few federal efforts to deal with such problems as child labor
and huge industrial combinations.u
Not surprisingly, unions were a particular target of the federal judiciary. Two favorite anti-union weapons used by business lawyers wete the injunction prohibiting certain activities,
and "yellow-dog contracts," in which employers required
prospective employees to agree not to join a union, or .to quit
their jobs if they did. Both the federal government and some
states had tried to ban the use of these "yellow-dog contracts,"
but the Supreme Court struck down these efforts as unconstitutional. The federal courts also issued injunctions to stop
strikes in transportation, and frequently applied the Sherman
Antitrust Act against union activities, many times more often
than to the businesses against whom the act was originally
directed. In the 1914 Clayton Act, Congress tried to limit the
use of injunctions against unions in antitrust and other cases,
but the courts nullified that effort as well.16
A Supreme Court decision in 1917 in a successful diversity
suit by mine owners against the United Mine Workers shows
how the injunction and ,;yellow-dog contracts" could be used
in tandem.
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The UMW was one of the few strong national unions then in
the country. When it tried to unionize workers at the Hitchman
Coal and Coke Company in West Virginia, the mine owners
sued the unions to enjoin activities, charging it with conspiracy
and wrongful interference with contract-the "yellow-dog
contract." The company's claims were based on state law and
were tried in federal court only because the union defendants
and the coal company were from different states. In a sweeping
decision, six members of the Court, with Justices Louis D.
Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and John Clarke dissenting,
gave the mine owners everything they wanted.
As Edward Purcell writes, the result was that:
After Hitchman the labor injunction swelled to flood tide . ..
By leveraging diversity jurisdiction, substantive due process,
and the independence of federal equity, Hitchman expanded
the power of the national courts and provided employers with
a lethal anti-union weapon. Prior to 19 17 yellow dog contracts
had not been used extensively, but by the end of the 1920s
they bound approximately 1,250,000 workers. To enforce
them the courts issued hundreds of injunctions. In the repressive atmosphere, union membership dropped by 1,500,000,
)
while unionized workers fell from 19.4 percent of the nonagricultural work force in 1920 to half that number a decade
17
later.

Between 1880and1920, state and federal courts issued almost
a thousand such injunctions, with the federal courts especially
active. Not until the Depression were the labor injunctio"Q. and
"yellow dog contracts" successfully curbed with passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 by overwhelming majorities in
both the Senate and the House. Efforts to eliminate or reduce
diversity jurisdiction failed, however.18
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Injunctions were used by federal judges not only against
labor unions but also against state efforts to control the rates of
regulated industries like electricity, gas, transportation, and
other utility companies that were started in the latter years of
the nineteenth century. In 1908 the Court allowed utility officials to enjoin state officials from enforcing rate orders claimed
to be "unreasonable" if a court found the rates "confiscatory"-a.ccording to a methodology favoring the utility. Like the
removal jurisdiction, the right to enjoin state officials became
a valuable weapon in ~ater effort5 to enforce individual rights
against unconstitutional and illegal state acts.
Prior to the New Deal, the federal government made few
efforts to control business or to regulate the market. The ~rst
significant attempt at federal regulation was in 1887, with the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to
control railroad pricing and to reduce the rampant discrimination and often ruinous competition caused by the harsh economics of the railroad industry. As Robert Rabin notes,
however, the Supreme Court was quick to undermine and
weaken the ICC. Its assault on railroad regulation began with
a decision in an 1889 state c~se giving courts the authority t<;>
review comm~sion-set rates for "reasonableness," what Rabin
explains as a reflection of the Court's suspicion that western
state legislatures influenced by the Populist movement would
not adequately "protect the financial interests of the railroads
and their wealthy backers." 1;!1e judiciary was to be, as in our
earliest days as a nation, "a bulwark between popular tyranny
and traditional respect for property rights."19
Once the ICC got undel'Way, the Supreme Court proceed~d
to undermine it. The Justices so restricted the commissions
rate-setting and policy-making powers that within.little more
than a decade, an angry Justice John Harlan called the commission "a useless body for all practical purposes." Congress
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became more involved in regulation with the 1907 enactment
of the Food and Drugs Act and the 1914 passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but the Court undermined the
commissions established to administer these laws as well. 20
Judicial conservatism was not limited to economic issues.
The judiciary was equally conservative on free speech and
racial and gender equality. Jim Crow was aided and abetted by
the Supreme Court in cases like Plessy v. Ferguson (1886),
which made "separate but equal" constitutionally acceptable
and doomed black people to decades of brutal segregation, and
Grovey v. Townsend (1935) which allowed Southern whites to
exclude black people from primary elections, the only elections
that counted in the South back then. Until 1930, restrictions
on free speech were consistently upheld by the Supreme Court,
despite powerful dissents from Brandeis and Holmes. Until
1940, the Court also refused to protect religious freedom. Few
efforts were made to restrain law enforcement or prosecutorial
abuses. The many civil liberties abuses during World War I and
its immediate aftermath, the Palmer raids, went almost entirely
unchecked by the courts, which in some instances, especially
those involving labor disputes, actively and sometimes enthusiastically participated in suppressing dissent. 21
This is not to say that during these years, the federal judges
were uniformly hostile to unions, workers, farmers, minorities,
and dissenters. Many decisions upheld state and local regulation of business interests. On the federal level, the Supreme
Court construed the 1890 Sherman Act to ban most market
sharing arrangements among independent entities. Ultimately,
though not initially, the Court also allowed the government to
·strike att some of the trusts like Standard Oil in 1911, though
the antitrust doctrines it established still allowed many large
conglomerations to go forward. There were also some decisions advancing civil rights _for blacks. And reversing its earlier
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restrictive attitude toward the ICC, the Court began to allow
the commission to exercise broad powers, declaring that it
would not interpose its own judgment of what was "wise."
Moreover, some federal and state judges were not conservative at all. Nevertheless, the overall composition of the federal
judiciary and the dominant feature of their jurisprudence
prior to the late 1930s strongly favored the haves against the
have-nots.22
The post-World War I period is well-known. During the
1920s, the conservatism of the nation and witch-hunts
against radicals continued. J. Edgar Hoover began amassing
his dossiers, and the federal courts continued to strike at state
regulation.
.
In 1929, the bubble burst. Franklin D. Roosevelt took office
in 1933 and launched a hdst of national programs and agencies
to deal with the Depression. The courts, including the Supreme
Court, were still dominated by conservative Republicans, a~d
they fought a vigorous rearguard action, striking down one
New Deal program after another, rendering the nation powerless to deal with the crisis. By 1936, the-Court had invalidated
six federal laws, including laws for industrial recovery, agriculture, mining, and railway pensions. The lower courts were also
busy. According to one estimate, they issued more than 2,000
injunctions against federal programs, mostly against taxes
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, though many other
programs were affected. Sheldon Goldman has found that
1,600 injunctions against New Deal programs were issued by
the lower courts just in 1935-36.23
In 1936 Roosevelt won by a landslide and hostility to the
Supreme Court was a major issue in the election. H~ ~ecided to
add new Justices to the Court to overcome the conservative
majority. He failed ignominiously, but it made no difference. In
1937, Supreme Court justice ()\yen Roberts abandoned· the
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conservatives, and within a few years, they were all replaced by
justices sympathetic to labor and the regulatory state.
The ,years from 1937 to 1960 reflected the enduring influence of the New D~ in some areas, but produced new crises
that New Deal attitudes and doctrines had either been unable
to anticipate, such as those arising out of the Cold War, or h?d
not tried to deal with, like African-American demands for true
equality.
This transitional period can be divided into four segments:
the New Deal judicial revolution, 1937-41; the war years,
1942-46; the immediate postwar period, 1947-50; and the
.Cold War era, 1951-60. As always, the strict hierarchy in the
federal judicial system made the Supreme Court the primary
actor.
1937-41. As a result of Justice Owen Roberts's "switch in
time" in April 1937, the Court began to turn away from its
attack on social legislation. The breakthrough came in the Jones
& Laughlin steel case, in which the Court allowed Congress to
regulate labor relations in manufacturing that could "have a
most serious effect upon interstate commerce." Soon, one New
Deal law after another was upheld as the Court turned away
from trying to monitor laws passed to deal with the national
economy, allowing Congress to regulate the farthest comers of
the national economy. For sixty years this doctrine held until
the arrival of the Rehnquist Court in the 1990s.14
Two other early judicial rulings had transfonnative effects.
In 1938, in Erie v. Tompkins, the 82-year-old Brandeis finally
succeeded in his long campaign to overthrow Swift v. Tyson.
Henceforth, federal judges would have to apply the substantive
law created by state judges and legislatures in diversity cases,
though the procedural rules, the rules that determine how a
case is tried, would still be a matter of federal faw; drawing the
line between "substance" and "procedure" would spawn years
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of uncertainty and litigation over what was substance and what
<
was procedure."
That same year, in the course of undoing the restraints on
Congressional authority over the national economy, the ~ourt
issued the most famous foomote in constitutional history, footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene Products. In that case, the Court
asserted that economic regulatory legislation was entitled to a
presumption of constitutionality. This meant that legislation
was not to be overturned unless .it was obviously unconstitutional, and the Court made it clear that this would be rare. Of
equal importance for the future, the Court suggested in footnote 4 that it would be much more skeptical of legislation
encroaching on the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and
other sections of the Constitution that protected individual
rights. It also raised the possibility tliat it might also be concerned about measures affecting racial or other "discrete and
insular minorities. "26
The following year, another of the Court's transformatiye
decisions was issued in a murder case from Connecticut
dealing with a state's right to appeal. In one of his last decisions
on the Court, justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote that state and
local officials must, like the federal government, honor those
rights that go "to the essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"
and that "lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions." J;his became known as the "incorporation doctrine,"
and in succeeding decades, the Court proceeded to "incorporate" most of the Bill of Rights such as the First Amendment
and protections for the criminally accused. 27
The Court's efforts to impose fair criminal procedures on the
states had actually begun much earlier, but only fitfully. In
1936, the Court began to try to eliminate the l;lSe of coercion
by state officials to obtain confessions, overturning a convic- .
tion in a Mississippi case in which a black man had .been
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hanged from a tree by his thumbs to force him to confess. In
ensuing years, the Court continued to overturn state convictions in a largely futile effort to stop the police from coercing
confessions, culminating with its decision in the Miranda case
28
in
. 1966.
. One other area began to be changed by the new Court in this
relatively brief period--civil rights for black Americans. Ever
since Plessy v. Ferguson, and even earlier, the Supreme Court
·had allied itseli more often with the white supremacists than
with civil rights advocates. As late as 1935, the pre-New Deal
Court had upheld an all-white primary in Texas, after striking
down
two earlier versions in 1927 and 1932. The 1935 deci..
sion was overruled nine years later, but even prior to that, in
il.938 the Court told Missouri it could not exclude a black
.appli_cant from its law school by offering to pay his tuition at
an·out-of-state law school, thereby starting the Court on the
~oad to Brown v. Board of Education. 29
...... The lower courts were also transformed. When Roosevelt
took office, according to Sheldon Goldman, he was not overly
concerned about the policy views of the lower court judi~aty, which in the early years of the New Deal was about
three-fourths Republican. But in 1935, when the New Deal
became more reformist in response to the continuing Depres-

.

sion, and the Republican-dominated judiciary struck down

.program after program, what Goldman calls the "policyagenda" reason for a judicial appointment became much
:more significant. Goldman found that overall, twenty-four of
if.DR's fifty Court of Appeals appointments were to further
his policy agenda, with twenty of these between 1935 and
1 940; most of the rest of his appointments were for partisan
olitical reasons. 30
~~;During Roosevelt's twelve years in office, the federal judi~ciary was expanded by some 25 percent to 193 district judges
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and fifty-nine appellate judges. Of these, he appointed 183 district judges and fifty circuit judges so that by 1945, the federal
judiciary had been transformed.
1942-46. During the war years, the Court continued to
enlarge federal power over the e~onomy, vigorously enforcing
the antitrust laws and giving a broad reading to the NorrisLaGuardia Act, so that labor was largely freed from court
injunctions.
The most prominent feature of this Court was, however, its
wartime decisions. It is a constant in American history, going
back to our first decade, that when the nation perceives a foreign or serious internal threat, the incumbent administration,
no matter which party is in power, adopts harsh measures .
against suspected enemies and all too often against those who
merely dissent. In the name of national security, civil liberties
are flagrantly violated. So it was in the late 1790s, when the
Federalist Party under John Adams and Alexander Hamilton,
believing that the revolutionaries in France and their American supporters like Thomas Jefferson and the RepublicanS
would destroy the Republic, passed the Alien and Sedition
Laws. With these laws, they prosecuted and severely punished
critics of the administration and party foes. One-hundrec\
twenty years later, World War I and then the American reaction to the Russian Revolution and its aftermath also produced
a wholesale abandonment of judicial concern for civil liberty.
This was repeated during the Cold War era, during the
Vietnam years, and now again post-September 11. Almost
invariably, the courts have rubber-stamped and sometimes
applauded what the authorities did.
The conventional wisdom is that after such abuses, the
nation and the courts advance the cause of civil liberry beyond
where the nation was before the crisis, thus making overall
progress. In fact, that has happened rarely. One such in.5tance
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was in 1969, when the Court adopted a stringent clear-andpresent-danger test whereby speech may be forbidden only if it
is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." But that was
during the 1960s, when the Court was in one of its rare
reformist phases, and has few if any parallels. Most of the time,
there has been little or no such forward movement, but merely

a return to the status quo once the hysteria subsided. At times,
the situation became worse, both in the society and especially
in the courts. The World War I abuses and the cases allowing
them were succeeded by the Red raids of 1919-20 which were
generally sustained by the courts, and then by the decisions in
the mid-1920s on "criminal syndicalism." The World War II
cases were followed by McCarthy-era decisions like the Dennis
case, which in turn were limited somewhat in the late 1950s.31
The low point of this period was the infamousJapanese internment case, Korematsu v. United States (1944), in which the internment of about 112,000 Japanese-Americans, 65,000 of whom
were citizens, was upheld by the Court. This decision has never
been overruled and, indeed, was cited as authority in 2001 by the
ultra-conservative Washington Legal Foundation and other conservative lawyers to support George W. Bush's Executive Order of
November 13, 2001 authorizing the establishment of military tribunals for "enemy combatants."32
The earliest World War II decision came in 1942, in Ex parte
Quirin, a case involving German saboteurs tried by a military tribunal. This case was the primary authority in support of the
Bush military tribunal order. In a hastily written decision the
Court upheld the use of these tribuna~s. A year after the war,
the Court upheld the death penalty for Japanese General
Yamashita in a proceeding rife with gross violations of the most
elementary due process. These "enemy combatant" cases have
never been judicially questioned, though members of the Quirin
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Court later expressed unhappiness with the opinion and decision,
and legal experts consider the decision poorly reasoned. 33
During this period, the Court continued to support the New
Deal with decisions upholding federal regulatory actions,
antitrust enforcement and protection of labor. It began to
expand First Amendment protections, suggesting in a 1946
case that these rights occupied a preferred position over property rights, and issued its landmark decision allowing schoolchildren who were Jehovah'.s Witnesses to refuse to salute the
flag during World War II, in deference to the Witnesses' religious convictions.34
1947-1960. The postwar period began a new chapter.in judicial history. N.o t only did the issues begin to change, bu~ the
composition of the Court changed significantly. New Deal
reformism waned, Cold War pressures began, and the Supreme
Court began to move to the right again, though this time on
different issues.
President Harry Truman was not too concerned about the ideological vi~ws of his nominees since by now there was no longer
much of a fight over the direction of national economic and social
policy. His primary concerns were patronage and friendship. Nevertheless, despite his own liberal leanings, between 1945and1949
Truman tilted the Supreme Court to the right. He appointed Fred
M. Vmson of Kentucky as chief justice, replacing Harlan F. Stone.
Owen Roberts and Roosevelt appointees Frank Murphy and
Wtley Rutledge also left the Court, and three new justices were
appointed--Harold H. Burton (1945), Tom C. Clark (1949), and
Sherman Minton (1949), all of whom were conservative, These
joined the liberal Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, and the
increasingly conservative fonner New Dealers Felix Frankfurter,
Robert Jackson, and Stanley Reed.
Three crucial judicial developments mark this period: The
Court began its tortuous efforts to separate church and state; it
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.barred judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants in deeds
that barred the sale of real property to nonwhites; and it issued
the first of its Cold War decisions.
· In the late 1940s, Cold War hysteria swept the nation, fomented
by the Republican Party and led by SenatorJoseph McCarthy. The
hysteria did not subside until the mid-l 950s, and in the second half
6.f the decade, the Court-with new members-began to curb the
most extreme of the excesses. By then, of course, countless individuals in all parts ofAmerican life had seen their careers and much
of their lives destroyed, in many cases beyond repair.
. The central judicial event of the decade of the '50s, however,
;was of course the school desegregation cases. The replacement
of Fred M. Vinson as ChiefJustice by Governor Earl Warren of
,Califomia was crucial, for unlike Vinson, he was totally committed to racial justice for blacks.* Upon his accession to the
High Court, Warren immediately set about producing an
.opinion in simple non-legalistic language that would have all
nine Justices behind it. The price of unanimity was the followup decision in 1955 to allow Southern school boards to desegregate the schools gradually. ·T his approach ultimately resulted
in delays of some thirteen years before the South was forced to
undertake school desegregation in earnest in 1968.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not too interested in the
·ideology of his appointees, even though Republicans by this
time accounted for only about one-fifth of the judges, and the
judiciary had a largely liberal approach. The courts had not yet
gotten as deeply into social issues as they were to become, and
Eisenhower was not interested in reversing the New Deal
anyway. He relied heavily on the Justice Department and was
primarily concerned with appointing middle,-of-the-road
* Though µot at the time for Asian Americans, ~aving built his political career in part
.on hostility to West Coast Chinese andjapanese immigrants and citizens. He had been
a moving force behind the Japanese Internment of 1942.
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lawyers of ability. For this reason, the American Bar Associatioi:i
was brought into the process and its ratings given a great deal of
weight.
For the Supreme Court, Eisenhower indicated early on that he
wanted experienced appellate court judges, and three of 1ti,.s four
appointments came from either the federal courts of appeal Qohn
M. Ha.r lan and Potter Stewart) or in one case, that of William J.
Brennan, from the New Jersey Supreme Court; the only exception
was Earl Warren.
'
~
As a result, some of the most important judicial figures in
the civil rights struggle of the ensuing years were Republican
lower court judges, such as Frank Johnson, Elbert Tuttle, and
John Minor Wisdom, even though Eisenhower himself was
unhappy with the Court's de;Segregation ruling. For these judges,
and particularly for the district judges in the trial courts, desegregation required great courage·, for it often brought down upon
their heads intense anger from longtime friends and associates, ~
social ostracism, and numerous death threats. By contr~t, many
Democratic judges had been appointed by segregationist
Southern senators and were not eager to enforce black rights.
1960-6[!. Between 1960 an~ 1968, the final of the three
great tra.nsformations of the twentieth century took shape.
The New Deal created the first two: a change in the relationship between the federal government and the American
people, which established a major role for the government in
Americari economic life, both to protect the economically
defenseless-labor unions, older people, workers-and to
control the excesses of business. The Brown case in 1954
started a third revolution, a "rights revolution," in which
racial minorities, women, criminal defendaiits, aliens, and
others victimized by our social and legal system fought for fair
and equal treatment. Initially, this was achieved through the
courts by black groups who demonstrated that the judicial
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system could be a powerful agent for social change. Black success in the courts led the way for the other groups, as well as
for the expansion of the right to free speech, church-state separation, reproductive rights, and more.
At about the same time, in the mid-1960s, Congress acted to
implement and expand on the judicial decisions, as well as to
create many new social programs, including Medicare, Head
Start, and the Legal Services Corporation. This judicial and legislative reformism hit a peak during 1960-68, though the early
1970s saw further regulatory developments on such matters as
consumer protection and the environment. The Supreme Coun
led the way of course, but the lower courts, increasingly staffed
by Kennedy-Johnson appointments, really made the decisions
of the Supreme Court the law of the land.
The primary concern of Kennedy and Johnson, but particularly of Lyndon B. Johnson, was to ensure that their Coun of
Appeals and District Court appointees were sympathetic
toward civil rights (though in some cases Kennedy was afraid
to cross powerful Sou them senators and appointed known segregationists). Sheldon Goldman has concluded that each made
three appointments to the Courts of Appeals on a "policy basis"
(the policy being civil rights), which accounted for 7 percent of
Kennedy's appellate appointmertts and 3 percent of Johnson's .
. "Partisan agenda" ireasons accounted for most of the res~, and

usually this also meant liberal Democrats.
In the late '605, the tide began to tum. The three revolutions
had struck at central features of American conservatism: The
New and Fair Deals, with their combination of regulation and
social welfare, struck at the freewheeling business practices of
corporate America and at the pocketbooks of the wealthy; the
rights revolution offended the social conservatives and the
South, which the Republican Party beg~p. to see as the key to
.its electoral s'u.ccess. Richard Nixon'~ 1968 "Southern strategy"
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,a key element of his presidential campaign, was the first of the
continuing Republican efforts to capitalize on the Souths hostility to fair treatment of America's blacks.
1969-1980. The accession. of Richard Nixon to the presidency began the process of deliberately restoring the federal
judiciary to its traditional conservatism. Nixon reintroduced
ideology into judicial appointments, to a degree not seen since
FDR, in order to promote his law=-and-order and Southern
agenda. The rhetorically neutral cover for this was "strict construction," to set up a contrast with the Warren Court's activist
approach. In practice, "stri~t construction" meant that t:Ae
courts would not move beyond already established principles
in their civil rights and civil liberties decisions, and would not
use the courts for social progress. They would work, instead, to
maintain the starus q1110. This was contrasted with "judicial
activism," which, in practice and as explained more fully
below, meant using the courts to move forward in these areas. 3'
Despite Nixons intentions, he does not see~ ·to have gone
about the task of picking "strict constructionists" very systeµiatically. Although a Nixon staff member urged the establishment of a review procedure for f~deral judges at all levels, there
seems to be no evidence that a formal vetting procedure was
ever adopted. And though Nixon obviously appointed conservative judges, since he chose Republicans almost entirely, it
does not appear that he was too concerned about the views of
his nominees on anything b1n criminal justice. Still, Nixon's
appointees did tilt the Court back to the right. It started, as it
had to, with the Supreme Court.36 • ·
But not yet and not entirely. In some respects, as Tom
Wicker points out, Nixon was a moderate. His four appointments to the Supreme Coun rumed out to cover a wide spectrum. His first appointment, the replacement of Chief justice
Earl Warren with Warren E. Burger, was relatively moderate,
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at least during Burger's early years on the Court. Nixon's
southern strategy stumbled when he failed to put either Judge
Glement Haynsworth of South Carolina or G. Harrold Carswell of Florida on the High Court to replace Abe Fortas, who
was forced to resign in 1969. Instead, Nixon had to settle for
Harry Blackmun, a_cautious moderate from Minnesota who
developed after a few years into one of the Court's staunchest
liberals on everything but criminal justice. Then, when Justices
Hugo Black and John Harlan died, one of the two successors
was Lewis Powell. Powell was a conservative Democrat from
Virginia, but, despite his conservatism, he often voted with the
liberals on the most controversial issues, thereby becoining the
swing vote as the Court became polarized along liberalconservative lines. The Court also continued to enforce the
antidiscrimination laws of the mid-1960s and to apply the principles of the Brown case to Northern schools. In all these areas,
the lower courts were crucial, since decisions on Northern
school-segregation frequently turned on complex factual disputes about intention and effect that the lower courts had to
resolve. If a violation was found, they also had to devise and
enforce complex remedies.
Nixon's fourth appointee-William Rehnquist-was something else. Rehnquist opposes almost everything that the federal
judiciary has done to advance human rights and government regulation during the past fifty years. He was raised in an extremely
conservative family that despised Roosevelt and the New Deal,
and from his boyhood days, he planted himself firmly on the farright end of the political spectrum. Until joined by Reagan
appointees Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, he was
often alone in dissent, even from his conservative colleagues on
the Burger Court.
.
Rehnquist was a brilliant law student at Stanford and became
a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson. During his clerkship,
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Rehnquist wrote a memo to Jackson in a case challenging the
exclusion of black voters from a Texas primary in which Rehnquist said, "ll is about Lime the Court faced the fact that the white
people in the South don't like the colored people; the Constitution restrains them from effecting this dislike through state
action, but it most assuredly did not appoint the Court as a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private discrimination
raises its admittedly ugly head." Jackson ignored him.38
When the Brown case came before the court, Rehnquist
urged that Plessy v. Ferguson be affirmed, which Jackson also
ignored. Rehnquist displayed the same hostility to Warren and.
Burger Court rulings. An April 1969 memo by Rehnquist when
he was Assistant Attorney General, which was not disclosed to
the Senate, castigated the Warren Court's criminal justice rulings and expressed disdain for the Court's decisions applying
most of the Bill of Rights to state and local officials, the "incorporation" doctrine discussed earlier. In addition, there was evidence that Rehnquist had harassed black voters in Phoenix,
Arizona, in the '60s. Rehnquist denied this of course, but there
were affidavits supporting the charges from numerous witnesses. One witness had heard Rehnquist say "I am against all
civil rights laws." In 1964 Rehnquist challenged a proposed
public accommodations ordinance for the City of Phoenix with
the comment that "the ordinance summarily does away with
the historic right of the owner of a drug store, lunch counter,
or theatre to choose his own customers." Despite all this,
Rehnquist was confirmed.39
During Gerald Fords brief tenure upon Nixon's resignation, he
had orie appointment, the successor to William 0. Douglas. Ford
was not an ideologue and his Attorney General was Edward Levi,
one of the most distinguished legal scholars in the· country.
Levi opted for quality over ideology, and to succeed Douglas, on
Levi's recommendation, Ford chose John Paul Stevens, a centrist
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Court of Appeals judge in Chicago, who has moved, often
unpredictably, from left to right and then back to left again. In
the 1990s, he came to identify more and more with the liberals,
as the Court~ center of gravity moved sharply to the right
! Because he was so often the lone dissenter, Rehnquist had
relatively little influence during his first years on the Court.
The result was th?t during the 1970s and for much of the
1980s, before Powell left the Court in 1987, the then-moderate
Burger, the increasingly liberal Blackmun, and the occasionally
moderate Powell made the Burger Court a surprisingly liberal
institution with respect to what were to become some of the
most contentious issues of the times-abortion, school desegregation , women's rights, affirmative action, and church-state
separation.
This is not to say that the Burger Court did not represent a
significant shift to the right. It did, particularly in criminal justice. While not overruling the landmark criminal justice decisions on searches, arrests, and confessions, the Court began a
process of chipping away at them by crafting exceptions in lax
interpretations of the decisions, a process that has continued to
this day. They did not tum the clock back to the time that police
were totally unaccountable, but by the time Rehnquist became
chief justice in 1986, there were few controls left, and certainly
far fewer than had been intended by the Warren Court.
States rights are another area in which the Burger Court conservatives tried to initiate what became a wide-ranging and
continuing crusade during the '90s. The goal of this campaign,
which has always been a major focus of Rehnquist's efforts, is
not so much the enhancement of state authority, except residually, but to curtail federal power, with the primary target the
New Deal and other social and regulatory legislation initiated
by Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson, and carried forward by
subsequent Congresses.
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Rehnquist's first victory in his crusade against the federal
government came in 1976, when the conservatives cobbled
together five votes, including a "not untroubled" Blackmun, to
strike down federal minimum wage and hour standards for
state employees. The statute violated state sovereignty, said
Rehnquist, writing for the Court. His victory was short-lived.
The criteria he laid down for applying the decision were so
ambiguous and uncertain that after nine years of judieial confusion, Blackmun switched to the dissenters and they overturned the 1976 decision:IO
Civil rights was another area in which the Court began to
move to the right. The most serious setback for the civil rights
movement came in a case in the mid-1970s. In a 1974 c~e
from Michigan, the Court prohibited school d~egregation
remedies that encompassed both an inner city and a suburban
school district unless both districts were found to have deliberately segregated their schools. It was rarely possible to prove
deliberate segregation by the newer suburbs, in contrast with
old inner cities like Detroit and Chicago. The result was to
encourage white flight to the suburbs and to doom minority
children to racial isolation.41
During Gerald Ford's brief tenure he appointed some
Democrats, though not to the Courts of Appeals. The primary
result of the Nixon and Ford appointments was that the lower
court judiciary shifted from 70 percent Democrat to more than
50 percent Republican by 1976.
During the Jimmy Carter presidency, there wer,e two major
developments that reflected and influenced the federal judiciary
profoundly. One was a nonevent: For the first time in the century, a president h~d no opportunity to make a Supreme Coun
appointment. He was thereby unable to significantly ~fluence
the nation's constitutional jurisprudence. On the other hand,
Congress increased the size of the federal judiciary by almo~t a
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third-from 525 to 677, adding 117 district judges and thirty.five appellate judges. This enabled Carter to exercise a strong
influence on the makeup of the federal judiciary despite his
short presidential tenure.
,. Carter also tried to reduce the partisan-political aspects by
requiring that judicial commissions be established to recom.IPend qualified candidates and to open up the process.
Although senators objected to this, Carter was able to establish
such commissions for the appellate courts, thus concentrating
these appointments in the White House, and leaving the district judges largely to the local Democratic senators, if there
were any.
Although Carter had no particular ideological agenda-most
of his appointees were middle of the road, and he appointed a
~umber of known conservatives-he was bent on increasing the
number of minorities and women. As a result, at the end of his
presidency, out of a total of 258 appointments, he had succeeded
in appointing forty women, twenty-nine to the trial bench and
eleven to the appeals courts, and fifty-five racial minorities,
forty-three district judges and twelve appellate judges. Democrats accounted for 60 percent of the lower court judiciary.
Because minorities and women tend to be more liberal than
others in the general population, which was especially true in
the '70s, this gave a distinctly liberal cast to the lower court judiciary. At the 'close of the Carter presidency, some 60 percent of
the federal judges were Democrats, of which 6.9 percent were
women. He appointed fourteen Hispanic district judges, two
Hispanic appellate judges, and for the first time, there were black
judges in eleven Southern and border states.42
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